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WASHINGTON CASE LAW-1954
of thirteen executive agencies to move the offices of those agencies from Seattle to
Olympia, the state capital. Affirming the lower court's action in overruling a demurrer
to the petition, the court, in a five to four decision, held: (1) In the absence of a
statute governing taxpayers' suits a demand on the proper officer to take action is a
condition precedent to the maintenance of a taxpayer's action challenging the validity
of what public officers have done or are about to do, unless facts are alleged which
show such a demand would have been useless; (2) the courts of the state have juris-
diction to determine questions of the location of the seat of government; (3) the Gov-
ernor should be dismissed as a respondent because the result of the order directed to
the heads of the agencies will be the same whether the Governor is a party or not, the
court declining to decide whether mandamus will lie to the Governor; (4) the state
constitutional provision for the location of the executive departments of the state,
Article III, § 24, in the light of the congressional enabling act and the historical back-
ground of the territorial laws, requires the location of the whole of the executive de-
partment at the seat of government. The dissent contended that since these executive
agencies existing subsequent to the passage of the constitution were created by the
legislature, the legislature, in the absence of limitation, has the power to locate the
offices of these agencies and that such location is a political, not a constitutional
question. See also Equity at page 138.
CONTRACTS
Quasi .Contractual Remedy in Unjust Enrichment - Cause of
Action. The problem of the quasi-contractual remedy for unjust en-
richment was raised in Mill & Logging Supply Co. v. West Tenino
Lumber Co.1 One Herrington had been operating a lumber mill in
Tenino under the name of Herrington Lumber Mill Co. and since 1939
had been regularly supplied with tools and machinery by the plaintiff
and its assignors. On November 23, 1948, he executed a bill of sale for
his mill to the Thurston County Investment Co., a co-partnership,
which in June 1949 transferred the mill to the defendant. Both of these
transfers were unknown to the plaintiff. Herrington continued to hold
himself out as the owner, doing business under the old firm name and
the plaintiff went on doing business with him as before. In March 1950
a receiver was appointed for the Herrington Lumber Mill Co. and the
plaintiff learned for the first time about the change in ownership. The
plaintiff brought this action to recover the value of the machines and
tools supplied on credit. The complaint failed to allege the relation be-
tween Herrington and the defendant. The trial court sustained a de-
murrer to the complaint and dismissed the action. On appeal the court
reversed and remanded the cause for a trial on the merits as to that
part of the indebtedness which was incurred since the transfer of the
title to the defendant. The decision, following the pleadings of the
144 Wn.2d 102, 265 P2d 807 (1954). See also Corporations at page 109.
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plaintiff, was based on the theory of a quasi-contractual remedy for
unjust enrichment.
It is, of course, elementary that a complaint which pleads facts suffi-
cient to state a cause of action on any theory is good as against a general
demurrer and since, as of the time of writing, it is not known what the
plaintiff will actually be able to prove it is impossible to make any very
broad or definitive statements. It must also be borne in mind that the
court followed the pleadings and arguments of the parties and that the
plaintiff did not bother to allege the relation between Herrington and
the defendant. However, the facts of this case, as presented in the
pleadings, do not seem to fit the usual quasi-contractual situations, but
rather an action on the contract executed by the agent of an undisclosed
principal. Using reasonable inferences from the facts pleaded it would
seem that Herrington, who was not the owner after the transfer of the
mill but who continued in a managerial capacity, could only be an agent
of the defendant. Because of the past history of dealings between Her-
rington and the plaintiff, as well as his holding himself out as owner
under the old firm name, there should be no difficulty in finding an
agency power' and thus an express contract between the plaintiff and
the defendant.
An extensive research does not disclose any Washington cases in
point. There is, however, authority for this proposition in other juris-
dictions. Watteau v. Fenwick,5 decided in England in 1893, is generally
cited as the leading case. There the defendants bought a tavern keeping
the previous owner as manager, leaving the old name over the door and
not giving any notice of the transaction. The authority of the new
manager was limited, but the defendants were held liable for credit
purchases in excess of his authority. The same doctrine had previously
been established independently in America in 1889 in the case of Hub-
bard v. Ten Brook," and first indicated in 1848 in a dictum in Smith v.
Jessup & Moore It has been applied in the case of a mother who
2 See the discussion of this concept in Seavey, Agency Powers, 1 OxLA. L. Rnv. 3
(1948).
8 [18931 1 Q.B. 346.
'124 Pa. 291, 16 Atl. 817 (1889). In this case the plaintiff sold hams to one Slade
who operated a grocery in his own name, but in fact as the defendant's agent. The de-
fendant denied Slade's authority to make any purchases. This holding was followed two
years later by the court in McCracken v. Hamburger, 139 Pa. 326, 20 At. 1051 (1891).
The court held that there was no error in an instruction to the jury, that unless they
found that the plaintiff knew of the change of ownership and of the former owner's
limited authority, they could find the defendant liable on the contracts made by the
former owner for the purposes of the distillery which he was managing for the de-
fendant without any visible change in his position.
6 5 Harr. 121 (Del., 1848).
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owned a photographic studio, operated by and in the name of her son6;
to an express company which bought a smaller company but continued
to operate it under the old name with the former manager in charge;
and to a defendant who put agents in charge of his business, who
operated under their own names but with limited authority.' The doc-
trine has been criticised in a recent Delaware case9 which is different
on its facts. The doctrine has been adopted and restatedby the Ameri-
can Law Institute in the Restatement of Agency."
Viewed in this way the case falls outside the quasi-contractual
remedy, as generally the law will not imply a quasi-contract where
there is an express one."1 The American Law Institute thus describes
the difference between true contracts and quasi-contracts, "Implied
contracts must be distinguished from quasi-contracts, which also have
often been called implied contracts or contracts implied in law. Quasi-
contracts, unlike true contracts, are not based on the apparent intention
of the parties to undertake the performance in question, nor are they
promises. They are obligations created by law for reasons of justice,' ' '2
Quasi-contracts have been repeatedly before the court and certain
necessary elements are clearly required before relief is given. One re-
quirement is that the enrichment of the defendant must be unjust. Thus
a public body benefited financially by the work of another, but which
was not in existence at the time of the performance of the work and
which did nothing to mislead the plaintiff or to induce his effort, was not
liable.' Similarly the unjust enrichment must consist of something of
eErnst v. Harrison, 86 N.Y. Supp. 247 (Sup. Ct., App. T. 1904).
7 Brooks v. Shaw, 197 Mass. 376, 84 N.E. 110 (1904).
8 Herkert & Meisel Trunk Co. v. Duncan, 141 Kan. 564, 42 P2d 587 (1935).
9 McCabe v. Williams, 43 Del. (4 Terry) 191, 45 A2d 503 (1944). In this case the
plaintiff supplied chicken feed on credit to a chicken farmer. When the chickens were
sold and he demanded his money he was informed that the chickens belonged to the
defendant who had advanced money for. their purchase and upkeep. The defendant
denied ownership. This case is different from the above, and treated as such by the
court, as the defendant was not the owner of the business but at best of the flock of
chickens. The court denied recovery holding that even if the defendant was the owner
it was a bailment situation. However, in a lengthy discussion the court criticized the
doctrine of Watteau v. Fenwick, without mentioning its own case of Smith v. Jessup &
Moore, supra note 5.
o RESTATEmENT, AGENCY §§ 194, 195 (1933).
"Shneider v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 196 Wis. 56, 219 N.W. 370 (1928). See
also RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 350 (1932).
22 RESTATamNT, CoNTRACTs § 5, comment (a) (1932).
is Chandler v. Washington Toll Bridge Authority, 17 Wn2d 591, 137 P2d 97
(1943). The plaintiff in this case, a construction engineer, performed engineering
studies in connection with the proposed Tacoma Narrows Bridge under a contrct with
a private company which was granted a franchise for construction. The franchise
expired because of time limitations during which construction was not commenced.
Thereafter the defendant was created by the legislature and benefited by the plaintiff's
work, especially in its negotiations with federal authorities.
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value passing from the plaintiff to the defendant.14 On the other hand
the unjust enrichment may be based on a tort, waived by the plaintiff,
who elects to sue in assumpsit. 5
Another requirement is, that the plaintiff in order to recover cannot
be a mere volunteer." The usual fact patterns involve either a plaintiff
who improves the realty of another relying on an unenforcible con-
tract," or a defendant who stands by and lets a plaintiff expend money
and labor because of a mistake of fact, such as the true state of mining
claims" or the correct boundary.' Another example of the same propo-
sition can be found in a case where the plaintiff performed services
under a mistake of fact as to his status in the defendant organization,
which knew of the mistake and actually induced it.2"
The theory of quasi-contracts has also been applied to cases of
fraud by known agents where part"1 or all" of the benefits inured to the
principal, who was estopped to deny the agent's authority without
24 Bowyer v. Boss-Tweed-Clipper Gold Mines, Inc., 195 Wash. 25, 79 P.2d 713
(1938.) In this case third persons, together with some stockholders of a gold mining
company, formed the defendant corporation in order to take up an option on mining
property, which became available after default of the mining company which was unable
to raise funds. The defendant was not held liable to creditors of the mining company
as no property of net value was transferred.
15 Olwell v. Nye & Nissen Co., 26 Wn2d 282, 173 P.2d 652 (1946). The defendant
wrongfully used in its operations an egg-washing machine belonging to the plaintiff,
which was kept in storage. The plaintiff waived the tort and recovered on the theory
of unjust enrichment, the court holding that saving in labor costs in using the machine
constituted a benefit.
16 Smith v. Kneisley, 187 Wash. 278, 60 P.2d 14 (1936). The plaintiff, attorney for
the estate, sued for a fee for services rendered in connection with a life insurance policy.
The court found that the defendant knew nothing of his efforts, if any.
17 Hardgrove v. Bowman, 10 Wn2d 136, 116 P.2d 336 (1941). In this case the
plaintiff recovered the value of the improvements put by him upon the defendant's
premises, under a lease which was unenforcible as the defendant's wife did not join in
the execution. Pitt v. Moore, 99 N.C. 85, 5 S.E. 398 (1888). In this case the executor
recovered the deceased partner's share of partnership improvements put upon the de-
fendant's land under an oral contract, unenforcible under the Statute of Frauds.
'1 Florence-Rea Copper Co. v. Iowa Mining Co., 105 Wash. 503, 178 Pac. 462 (1919).
In this case the owner of a mining claim, who stood by for over two years and per-
mitted the defendant to incur expenses in development, was estopped from asserting
possessory rights to the claim.
19 Rhyne v. Sheppard, 224 N.C. 734, 32 S.E.2d 316 (1944). The plaintiff who by
mistake built on the defendant's land instead on his own, was permitted to recover as
the defendant knew of the mistake and stood by letting the plaintiff proceed.
20 Houston v. Monumental Radio, 158 Md. 292, 148 Atl. 536 (1930). The defendant
corporation, which took over the operation of a radio station, knew that the plaintiff
believed that the station was still operated by a partnership of which he was a member.
The amount of the recovery was the difference between the amount actually paid and
the reasonable worth of his services.
21 First National Bank of Las Vegas v. Osborne, 121 Ill. 25, 7 N.E. 85 (1886). The
defendant's agent indorsed commercial paper in the defendant's name without authority
and negotiated it to the plaintiff. He used part of the proceeds to pay the defendant's
creditors and appropriated the balance. Held, that the defendant was liable to the
extent of the proceeds received.
22 Bluefield National Bank v. Picklesimer, 102 W.Va. 128, 135 S.E. 257 (1926). In
this action against the receiver of a bankrupt bank it was held that the plaintiff could
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having first restored the property to the injured party. There is, of
course, no liability where the principal has received no benefits.2" In
these cases the acts of the agents were not only unauthorized, but also
tortious and criminal. There is an alternative theory upon which these
cases could have been solved. The retention of benefits by such a princi-
pal constitutes a ratification of the agent's unauthorized act. This prin-
ciple does not, however, apply to the present case in which the exist-
ance of the principal was unknown to the plaintiff; the general rule
being that ratification can occur only where the agent purported to act
for a principal.24 While the result in both cases may be substantially
the same, the basis of liability in the present case more properly falls
within the rule of Watteau v. Fenwick25 than either within the rule of
ratification by acceptance of benefits or the principles of quasi-con-
tracts.
It is apparent that this case extends the application of quasi-con-
tractual remedies in Washington. It would also give, should the doc-
trine of Watteau v. Fenwck26 be adopted in this jurisdiction, an injured
party who was dealing with an apparent owner in ignorance of the
true owner a choice of remedies in either suing on the contract or in
quantum valebat upon the theory of unjust enrichment.
lflegal Bargains-Effects of Illegality. During 1954 two cases involv-
ing illegal bargains came up on appeal,2 ' and both were reversed.
These cases raised the basic problem of the rules applicable and, at
least by implication, of the public policy considerations involved.
The first of these cases2" involved a sum of money entrusted by the
plaintiff to the defendant for the purpose of obtaining a retail beer
license for plaintiff's grocery which had been denied by the State Liquor
Board. The defendant, a long time friend of the plaintiff, represented
that he knew someone in the County-City building who could get a
license. The license was never produced and the money was not re-
recover the proceeds of two checks forged by one of the bankrupt's officers, fraudulently
accepted in the name of the bankrupt and negotiated to the plaintiff, the proceeds
inuring to the bankrupt.2 3 Alliance Corp. v. Sheridan Theatre Co., 241 N.Y. 216, 149 N.E. 837 (1925). The
defendant's president obtained a loan on forged notes, deposited the proceeds in the
defendant's account and at once withdrew them on a forged check and converted them
to his own use.24 Kraft v. Spencer Tucker Sales, Inc., 39 Wn.2d 943, 239 P2d 563 (1952); RE-
STATEmENT, AGEN y § 85 (1) and comment (a) (1933).
2s Supra note 3.
26 Ibid.
27 Sinnar v. LeRoy, 44 Wn2d 728,.270 P.2d 800 (1954) ; Anderson v. Petridge, 145
'Wasli.Dec. 278, 274 P2d 352 (1954).
28 Sinnar v. LeRoy, supra note 27.
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turned. The defendant did not plead illegality; and both parties were
very vague as to the methods to be employed, the plaintiff stating on
the stand that he did not care how the money was spent as long as the
license was obtained. The defendant testified that he gave the money
to a man in the County-City building who neither returned it nor pro-
duced a license. The man was never properly identified and there was
no other evidence as to this purported transaction. The trial court en-
tered judgment for the plaintiff which was reversed on appeal with a
direction to dismiss the action.
On appeal the primary question raised was whether the failure of
the defendant to plead illegality amounted to a waiver. The court held
that it did not, relying primarily on the Restatement of Contracts §600
and comment (a) thereto. This point is well settled in all American
jurisdictions and in England, and need not be elaborated. However,
the case was treated by the parties and by the court, as another case in
this area, when in fact it is one of first impression in Washington. Prior
Washington cases dealt with an agent who, through the use of personal
influence, bribery, or other illicit means, obtained some advantage for
his principal, and was suing to recover his fee. In this case the principal
was suing the agent. It is a well settled principle in the jurisdictions
which have dealt with it, that money placed in the hands of an agent
for the purpose of bribery or other illegal use, but not so used, may be
recovered by the principal,"9 as no illegal transaction has as yet taken
place. However, if even a part of the money has been spent in such
illegal transaction,"0 the principal is barred from recovery. Thus it
seems that the purported transaction between the defendant and the
mythical man in the County-City building should have been one of the
main issues of the case.
The court based its decision to dismiss the action on the holding in
Goodier v. Hamilton,"' where the court laid down the rule that if there
is a possibility of illegality the contract should not be enforced. At the
same time the court distinguished another leading Washington case in
29 Wasserman v. Sloss, 117 Cal. 425, 49 Pac. 566 (1897) ; Ware v. Spinney, 76 Kan.
289, 91 Pac. 787 (1907) -Adam Express Co. v. Reno, 48 Mo. 264 (1871) ; Liebman v.
Rosenthal, 185 Misc. 83, 57 N.Y.S2d 875, affirmed 269 App.Div. 1067, 59 N.Y.S.2d
148 (1945) ; Kiewers v. Rindskopf, 46 Wis. 481, 1 N.W. 163 (1879).
80 Stone v. Freeman, 298 N.Y. 268, 82 N.E.2d 571 (1948). This case is distinguish-
able from Liebman v. Rosenthal, supra note 29 on the facts, as well as on the formal
distinction that part of the money was spent.
81 172 Wash. 60, 19 P.2d 392 (1933). In this case the defendant promised the plaintiff
$1000 if he would find an attorney who could get him a license, after several attorneys
had turned down the employment. The court in this case was impressed by the gravity
of having the services of lawyers auctioned and bartered on the market.
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this area82 which laid down another broad proposition, that the law will
not presume illegality unless forced to do so, on the unusual ground
that this case came up on demurrer and not after a trial on the merits.
The court seems to have been bothered by the apparent inconsistency
of these cases for some time. In another recent case, the court was
faced with this problem and said:
In determining whether or not a contract is inherently corrupt, however,
we seem to have applied a less stringent test in the Hall case than in the
earlier Goodier case. In the Hall case, we stated that a contract was not
inherently corrupt if it "could conceivably have been lawfully performed,"
while in the Goodier case we held that a contract should be condemned if
it "contains the germ of possible corruption."38
The court refused to reconcile the two lines of authority, as it held that
the contract would be illegal under either test, having adopted the con-
struction of the executive order in question found in federal cases,
which permits of no exceptions and treats the order as a statement of
public policy in the area.
The court further laid down a broad proposition that illegality is
such a serious matter that it may not be waived and, if suspected, the
court should call witnesses on its own motion to probe into it. That
such may be the case was recently dramatically illustrated in an English
case." However, the proposition as stated seems again to conflict with
several Washington cases. In an early case 5 the court said that it was
proper to sustain an objection to a question tending to show illegality
of consideration, where the plaintiff did not plead illegality in defend-
ant's cross-complaint on a note and the matter came up for the first
time in his evidence in chief. However, a careful reading discloses that
this was a mere dictum as there was another valid ground for objec-
82Hall v. Anderson, 18 Wn2d 625, 140 P2d 266 (1943). In this case the defendant,
a contractor who submitted the lowest bid on a federal construction project, employed
plaintiff, an attorney, to go to Washington, D.C. and try to persuade the War Depart-
ment "by legal means" to award the contract to the defendant. Compensation was to
be on a contingent fee basis, which was in violation of art. 12 of the proposed contract.
The court said that it was not shown whether at the time of the execution of the
contract either party knew about this provision.
8" York v. Gaasland Co., 41 Wn.2d 540, 545; 250 P.2d 967, 970 (1952). This case
involved an oral contract whereby the plaintiff was to be paid 10,000 if he could obtain
a road construction job in Alaska for the defendant. The evidence disclosed that the
plaintiff spent several hundred dollars in entertaining government officials in Washing-
ton, D.C. An executive order, Executive Order No. 9001 promulgated by the President
on December 27, 1941, prohibited any agreements whereby government contracts would
be solicited.
"4 Napier v. National Business Agency, [19511 2 All Eng. 264 (C.A.), which in-
volved a false provision for "expenses" in an employment contract, the purpose being
to defraud the revenue authorities. Neither party raised the issue and it was held that
the burden fell upon the judge to carry out the investigation to the best of his ability.
"5 Lyts v. Keevey, 5 Wash. 606, 32 Pac. 534 (1893).
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tion. In a later case3" the court held that the defendant was precluded
from introducing evidence of illegality where he failed to plead it as an
affirmative defense. This case in turn was distinguished in Rathke v.
Yakima Valley Grape Growers Association, 7 which held that the ille-
gality is shown on the face of the contract or brought out by the plain-
tiff's evidence, the failure of the defendant to plead it will not bar the
defense.
On the other hand the broad language of the court in the present
case, which seems to preclude waiver of illegality, finds support in
at least two Washington cases."8
Finally the court closes the opinion of this case, after having estab-
lished that the parties were in pari delicto, by reiteration of the often
repeated policy statement that, "... a court will not knowingly aid
in the furtherance of an illegal transaction, but will leave the parties
where it finds them . . ."" However, even here there is seeming author-
ity to the contrary"0 , where, in an equitable suit for accounting between
partners, relief was granted on the basis that the money was the
product of an illegal transaction in which both parties were equally
culpable.
The other recent case in this area" involved an action against the
estate of Albert C. Petridge, deceased, on a written contract for
personal services. The contract, in the form of a letter from deceased
to the plaintiff and antedated by three months, was executed in Van-
couver, B.C. and provided for services by the plaintiff as a nurse and
"1Wolfe v. Philippine Investment Co., 175 Wash. 165, 27 P.2d 132 (1933). The
case involved the division of insurance policy fees in violation of RRS 7077 (this
statute was repealed by the laws of 1947 ch. 79 art. 34).
37 30 Wn.2d 486, 192 P.2d 349 (1948). The illegality here involved was the viola-
tion of the Robinson-Patman Act [15 U.S.C. § 13 (a) (b) & (c) (1952)].
38 Reed v. Johnson, 27 Wash. 42, 67 Pac. 381 (1901). In this case directors of a
railroad were promised a part of the land to be conveyed to the defendant in considera-
tion of the defendant's efforts to have the railroad establish a depot on the plaintiff's
land. Lower v. Cornelius, 72 Wash. 124, 129 Pac. 911 (1913). In this case the lower
court sustained a demurrer to an answer pleading illegality, violation of REM. & BAL.
CODE § 6282 prohibiting manufacturers of alcoholic beverages to have financial interests
in retail outlets. The sweeping statement of the court, ". . . If such illegality appears
in the pleadings of either party, it (the court) will not go into the technical accuracy
of such pleadings; if it appears in the statement of witnesses at the trial, it will not
inquire into the technical admissibility of such statements as evidence, but will in either
case, start an inquiry of its own .. ." goes far beyond the needs of the case. It may be
noted in passing that the case was decided at a time when the problem of alcoholic
beverages constituted one of the main national issues.
944 Wn.2d 728, 731; 270 P.2d 800, 802 (1954).
40 Melton v. United Retail Merchants of Spokane, 24 Wn.2d 145, 163 P2d 619
(1945). In this case the plaintiff, who did not have a state license as common carrier,
hauled goods for the defendant; the plaintiff's trucks were registered in the defendant's
name.
41 Anderson v. Petrige, supra note 27.
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driver. Decedent, a married man who was separated but not divorced,
proposed marriage to the plaintiff. The plaintiff did not discover the
decedent's marital status until about a year later. While in Seattle
the parties had an illicit relationship, which was proved by the defend-
ant by introducing the pleadings in an action for breach of promise
and seduction brought by the plaintiff which had been abated by
death. The parties also executed, beside the contract sued upon, a
number of other instruments which were described by the plaintiff
as "phony". The trial court, sitting without a jury, found as a matter
of fact that the parties never intended to be bound by the document,
that the services performed by the plaintiff were in consideration of
the promise of marriage which was made before the actual date of
the contract, and dismissed the action. On appeal, the defendant, in
support of the judgment, argued that the contract was illegal because
of the illicit relation and because it violated a federal statute 2
The court, which generally seems to take a properly liberal attitude
in cases involving wronged women,"3 dealt first with the problem of
illicit relations as consideration. Relying on authority from other
jurisdictions," this being a case of first impression in Washington,
the court followed the general rule that such contracts will be enforced,
unless made in contemplation of such illicit relation. Thereupon the
court reversed the finding of facts of the lower court and held the
contract to have been bona fide.
The second point would seem to be slightly more difficult, as the
court was faced by a Washington case in point. 5 The court avoided
the difficulty by the simple expedient of ignoring the case and disposing
of the cause as if it had been one of first impression in Washington.
The court relied on only one federal case, quoting from it the public
policy of the statute and holding that the instant case was not within
the evils legislated against.'"
42 8 U.S.C. § 141 (1946) ; repealed by sec. 403 of the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952 [8 U.S.C. § 1101 Repeals (1952)].
43 See Opitz v. Hayden, 17 Wn2d 347, 135 P.2d 819 (1943).
44 One of the cases relied on by the court, Feig v. Bank of Italy, etc., 14 P.2d 612
(Cal.App. 1932), does not seem to be in point.
45Tompkins v. Seattle Construction Co., 96 Wash. 511, 165 Pac. 384 (1917). Plain-
tiff, a British subject, contracted with the defendant in Vancouver, B.C. to work in
the defendant'sSeattle plant Thereafter the parties renewed their contract in Seattle
on the same terms. The plaintiff was discharged. The court held that the first illegal
contract had been incorporated into the second contract also rendering it illegal. The
case is criticized in 6 CoRBIN, CoN rRAcrs § 1533 (1951).
46 It may seem overly meticulous to discuss the point at length as the statute in
question is repealed and the exact question cannot arise. However, both the case of
Anderson v. Petrige, supra note 27 and Tompldns v. Seattle Construction Co., supra
note 45, may, and quite probably will be cited as authority for the effect of illegality
1955]
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The brief citation of cases may produce the impression of conflicting
and irreconcilable authority. In considering approaches to these prob-
lems a distinction is made between the strict or federal rule' and the
liberal or majority rule. In a recent law review article'8 Washington
is included among the states following the federal rule on the authority
of Hall v. Anderson;" however, we have seen that there are cases in
this state which seem to follow the majority rule. It seems to the
present writer that the basic difficulty stems from the attempt to treat
the whole field as one, and devise a single rule applicable to all cases.
At the same time, when confronted with actual facts, the courts mold
results to the exigencies of the cases in order to do justice."0 Much of
the seeming confusion would be avoided if express recognition were
given to the fact that there are at least two, if not more, distinct
problems requiring different rules, depending on the gravity of the
illegality, and that over the years cases move from one line of authority
to another with the changing mores of society.5 If the existence of
several problems, and of corresponding rules, were recognized, the
futile attempt at reconciling irreconcilable cases would be avoided;
when limited to their facts, the cases would stop presenting a confusing
picture and would, with few exceptions, fall into an orderly pattern.
The main line of division, running somewhat along the distinction
between mala prohibita and mala in se as these terms are used in
criminal law, is clearly discernible, separating illegal acts which merely
violate some statutory provision from those which offend the moral
sense of society. 2 Within this broad framework there are subdivisions
upon the enforceability of contracts and thus it would have been simpler if the Tompkins
case had been overruled.
47 This rule is generally associated with the case of Providence Tool Co. v. Norris,
2 Wall. 45 (U.S. 1865), which had laid down the rule that all bargains contemplating
the obtaining of government contracts, of desired legislation, etc. are illegal and unen-
forceable per se. The later case of Steel v. Drummond, 275 U.S. 199 (1927), radically
departed from this rigid rule without, however, overruling the above case.
48 39 CORNELL L. Q. 433 (1952-53).
49 Supra note 32. This must be a mistake as the leading Washington case following
the federal rule is Goodier v. Hamilton, supra note 31 and the Hall case represents the
more liberal approach.
50 For instance the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Claflin v. U.S.
Credit System Co., 165 Mass. 501, 43 N.E. 293 (1896), refused to enforce an insurance
contract made in violation of Massachusetts law, even though the illegality was not
raised in the lower court at all. However, the same court refused to raise the issue of
illegality where the bargain was made on Sunday, in O'Brian v. Shea, 208 Mass. 528,
95 N.E. 99 (1911).
51 For instance the declining importance of the execution of a contract on a Sunday
which, in another age, was tinted with moral turpitude.
52 Thus the carrying of goods in Melton v. United Retail Merchants of Spokane,
supra note 40, was not inherently immoral. It is not difficult to imagine what the court
would have done if the suit for accounting had been between partners engaged, for
instance, in the operation of a house of prostitution.
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allowing for variations in cases where the parties are not in pari delicto,
or where one party is thought to need special protection because of
inferior economic bargaining power "8 or prevailing notions of fairness
and cdlivalry."
Commission of Realtor-Time of Execution of Contract. In Burt
v. Heikkala," the plaintiff, a real estate broker, contracted with the
defendants for a six month exclusive agency to sell the defendants'
theatre at Woodland, and thereafter for a non-exclusive agency ter-
minable by either party by written notice. The plaintiff was to earn
1076 commission if he produced a buyer who would buy within 90 days
of the termination of the contract. The plaintiff showed the property
to a prospective buyer, but no .sale was then made. However, the
prospective buyer then secretly negotiated with the defendants, who
gave the plaintiff a written notice of termination. The prospective
buyer sold his home in California, bought a home in Woodland and
was introduced by the defendants to the community. The conveyance
was executed on the 91st day for the price specified in the agency con-
tract less the amount of the commission. Judgment for the plaintiff
was affirmed. The evidence, especially the sale and purchase of a
home by the prospective buyer, was sufficient to establish a contract
of sale during the life of the agency contract. The court stated that it
is the production of a person ready, willing, and able to buy that entitles
a broker .to his commission, not the final closing of the deal.
This case is one of first impression in Washington, but the result
was to be expected. While normally a broker employed to sell within
a definite time must negotiate the sale within the time fixed to earn the
commission,"6 the court said previously that an exception to the rule
shall be made where the failure of the broker to perform is due to the
fraud or fault of the defendant."" A case almost exactly like the prin-
cipal one was decided it Louisiana," where the court used circum-
BeSee Rathke v. Yaldma Valley Growers Association, supra note 37.
54 See Anderson v. Petrige, supra note 27.
a' 44 Wn.2d 52, 265 P2d 280 (1954).
5 Kane v. Dawson, 52 Wash. 411, 100 Pac. 837 (1909) ; Swift v. Starrett, 117 Wash.
188, 200 Pac. 1108 (1921) ; Pavey v. Collins, 31 Wn2d 864, 199 P.2d 571 (1948).57 Davis & Co. v. Aabling, 117 Wash. 579, 202 Pac. 2 (1921). This was a dictum
as recovery was denied since the prevention was not caused by the defendants, who on
the contrary were eager to close the deal.58 Wolf v. Casamento, 185 So. 537 (La. Ct of App. 1939). The plaintiff broker
recovered the whole commission even though the sale was consumated after the ex-
piration of the 90 days period when the court found bid faith on the part of the de-
fendant. The fact most relied upon by the court in finding secret dealings with the
buyer was the application by the vendee for a loan ori the premises before the convey-




stantial evidence to establish a contract of sale during the life of the
agency contract. The Louisiana case and the principal case represent
the general rule applicable in this exceptional situation.59
Of course, this problem represents a specialized application of the
broader rule that the unjustified prevention of performance of a
condition eliminates it. As said by Corbin, "One who unjustly pre-
vents the performance of a condition of his own promissory duty
thereby eliminates it as such a condition. He will not be permitted to
take advantage of his own wrong, and to escape from liability for not
rendering his promised performance by preventing the happening of
the condition on which it was promised."'0
Accord and Satisfaction-Consideration. In Douglas County Me-
morial Hospital Association v. Newby"' the defendant wife received
medical treatment in the plaintiff hospital between November, 1952
and February 10, 1953, the date of the final discharge, at which time
the defendants owed $715.86, the amount not being in dispute. The
defendant husband, a farm hand, was unable to pay at once and after
a talk with the head nurse he signed a card whereby he obligated
himself to pay $20 a month. The defendants made regular payments
for ten months when they were requested by a member of the board
of trustees of the plaintiff to execute an interest bearing, negotiable
note which could be discounted at a bank. The defendants refused
claiming that the plaintiff was bound by its contract. The plaintiff
attached the defendants' car and started an action in which it recovered
a judgment for the whole balance, the trial court holding that the
plaintiff's promise to accept $20 a month was not supported by con-
sideration and thus not binding. The Supreme Court reversed saying,
We hold that respondent, under the facts of this case, is estopped to deny
that there was no valid consideration for the written contract. By the
contract appellants were induced to voluntarily pay to the hospital a
substantial portion of the debt which they were wholly unable to pay in
a lump sum when it was incurred. Without any inconvenience or expense
of collection, the hospital received approximately one third of the in-
debtedness. Respondent should not now be allowed to attack either the
executed or the executory portion of the written contract.62
59 An exhaustive collection of authorities can be found in 27 A.L.R.2d 1357 (1953).
See also 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 768 (1951).603 CoRBiN, CoNTRAcTs § 767 (1951). See also, RESTATEMENT, CONTRAcTs § 295
(1932).
6' 145 Wash.Dec. 731, 278 P2d 330 (1954).62 Douglas County Memorial Hospital Association v. Newby, 145 Wash. Dec. 731,
741, 278 P.2d 330, 336 (1954).
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Thus the problem of sufficiency of consideration, to make an accord
legally binding, was once more discussed by the court which returned
to its earlier position abandoned for more than twenty years.
The rule that the payment of a lesser sum of money, even when
accepted by the creditor in full satisfaction, cannot discharge a liqui-
dated debt is usually associated with the case of Foakes v. Beer." The
facts of this case were very similar to the facts of the principal case.
The plaintiff judgment creditor agreed to accept payments in instal-
ments in full satisfaction. When the principal was paid the plaintiff
brought an action for the interest on the original obligation. The House
of Lords held for the plaintiff on the authority of a dictum by Lord
Coke in Pinnel's Case.6" The full historical background of the doctrine
is discussed in the leading textbooks on contracts."5 The doctrine has
been adopted and restated by the American Law Institute.6 However,
the doctrine has been repudiated in several jurisdictions by statute and
in others by court decision.'
The early Washington cases expressed an unwillingness to follow
the doctrine. 8 As far as the present writer was able to ascertain the
earliest Washington case in point is Rockford Shoe Co. v. Jacob"' in
which the plaintiff brought an action for goods sold and delivered on
February 25, 1892, alleging that the purchase price became due and
payable on February 1. The defendant alleged in his answer that by
the terms of the credit the price was not due until April 1. The plaintiff
replied admitting that it promised an extension of time until April 1,
but claiming that the promise was not legally binding as not supported
by consideration. The court held that the plaintiff having admitted the
extension was estopped from saying that such promise was void for
want of consideration. This was shortly followed by two cases which,
while not quite in point, strongly criticized the rule that a lesser sum
could not discharge a liquidated obligation and took a stand for the
63 L.R. 9 App. Cas. 605 (1884).
645 Coke 171a (1602).
051 CoRRIN, CoNTRA Ts § 174-5 (1950) and 6 CoaniN, CoNTRACTS 1281 (1951)
where the rule is strongly criticized. 1 WILLIsTON, CONTRAcTs § 120 (Rev. ed. 1936)
where the rule is supported, primarily because it is consistent with the general common
law doctrine of consideration.66RSTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 76(a) and § 417 comment (c) (1932).
v Clayton v. Clark 74 Miss. 499, 22 So. 189 (1896) ; Frye v. Hubbell, 74 N.H. 358,
68 Atl. 325 (1907).
68 1 WMLLISTON, CoNTRAcTs 120 (Rev. ed. 1936) in footnote 8, Washington is listed
as belongihg to the minority which abrogated the orthodox rule.
69 6 Wash. 431, 33 Pac. 1057 (1893).
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minority position. 0 In Evans v. Oregon & Washington Railroad Co."
the plaintiff subcontractor refused to continue performance and was
about to abandon the written contract. The court held that the prin-
cipal contractor's oral promise to pay an additional sum of money was
enforceable. The court said:
We think the better rule is that, where a party has breached his contract
and refused to perform it, it is optional with the adverse party to sue him
for damages, or waive the breach, treat the contract as abrogated, and
enter into a new contract with the delinquent party. It would seem to
be elementary that parties competent to contract can abrogate or rescind
the contract and enter into a new contract touching the same subject
matter to be performed, in the same or a different way, upon a different
consideration.12
This case while not dealing with a liquidated debt illustrates the court's
approach to the antecedent duty rule.
Also in this category fall cases where the court enforced a promise
by a mortgagee to remit overdue interest on the note secured by the
mortgage;" or where an oral agreement to reduce the rental on a
written lease was held supported by sufficient consideration, as other-
wise the lessee would have abandoned the lease because of inability to
pay 4 Finally in Vigelius v. Vigelius5 the court held that a divorced
wife, who for twelve years accepted one-third of the alimony pursuant
to an oral agreement with the defendant, was estopped from asserting
want of consideration. These early cases are fully discussed in Shep-
herd and Shattuck: "Accord and Satisfaction in Washington."76 The
authors closed this part of their discussion by saying, "Apparently
these cases, while never expressly overruled, have been ignored and
the later decisions indicate an adherence to the orthodox rule.177
70 Brown v. Kern, 21 Wash. 211, 57 Pac. 798 (1899). An agreement by a judgment
creditor with a financially embarrassed judgment debtor to accept partly cash and
partly a note secured -by mining stock, was binding and discharged the debt. The
creditor, who recovered the judgment against two defendants, entered into such inde-
pendent agreements with both for one half of the judgment. The other judgment
debtor did not perform. The court criticized the rule of Foakes v. Beer as not in
accordance with good morals. Williams v. Blumenthal, 27 Wash. 24, 67 Pac. 393
(1901) (the accord consisted of an acceptance of a lesser sum in satisfaction of ajudgment and of the relinquishment of the right of appeal).
See also, Baldwin v. Daly, 41 Wash. 416, 83 Pac. 724 (1906). In this case a lesser
sum was paid in full satisfaction before maturity. In a dictum the court strongly
criticized the orthodox rule.
7158 Wash. 429, 108 Pac. 1095 (1910).
72Evans v. Oregon & Washington Railroad Co., 58 Wash. 429, 431; 108 Pac. 1095,
1095 (1910).
73 Hidden v. German Saving & Loan Society, 48 Wash. 384, 93 Pac. 688 (1908).
74 Conlau v. Spokane Hardware Co., 117 Wash. 378, 201 Pac. 26 (1921).
7 169 Wash. 190, 13 P2d 425 (1932).
8 WASH. L. Rav. 112 (1934).
778 id. at 115.
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As early as 1911 in Seattle, Renton & Southern Railway Co. v.
Seattle-Tacoma Power Co.,"8 the court said that the payment in full of
the liquidated amount could not discharge the disputed amount as
there was nothing left which could operate as consideration. It must
be added, however, that the plaintiff in that case never accepted the
payments in full satisfaction. In Plymouth Rubber Co. v. West Coast
Rubber Co. 7 1 the court discussed the three possibilities in this area: a
liquidated obligation which cannot be discharged by the payment of a
lesser sum of money; an unliquidated obligation which can be dis-
charged by the payment of any sum of money if it is given and received
in full satisfaction; and a liquidated obligation which can be discharged
by the payment of a lesser sum of money and the giving of some goods,
which was the situation in the Plymouth case.
In Champagne v. McDonald"0 the court adopted the orthodox rule
holding that an agreement to extend the time of payment of a liquidated
amount due upon a bill of sale and to* make a 10% reduction thereof
if paid within such time, was not binding upon the promisor as there
was no consideration for the promise. Similarly in Anderson v. Sani-
tary Dairy, Inc.,81 the court held that the payment of $743 could not
discharge an undisputed indebtedness of $2000. It must be added,
however, that it was questionable in this case whether the payment of
the lesser sum was accepted in full satisfaction. Also the cashing by
a landlord of a check for rent due, which was marked that it was in
payment for rent until the end of the lease, did not discharge the
tenant.8 2 In a case involving a coal mine lease, where one of the issues
was whether the payment of a lesser amount by the lessee could dis-
charge his indebtedness, the court formulated the orthodox rule in its
full rigidity:
Where a debtor pays what in law he is bound to pay and what he admits
that he owes, such payment by the debtor and its acceptance by the
78 63 Wash. 639, 116 Pac. 289 (1911). (The contract for electric current provided
for minimum payments of $1000 a month irrespective of amount furnished. A dispute
arose as to the proper method of computation and the buyer sent a check for $1000 each
month in full satisfaction. The seller cashed the checks and applied the proceeds on
account. Held, there was no accord and satisfaction as there was no consideration.)
79 131 Wash. 662, 231 Pac. 25 (1924). (The amount of the debt for goods sold, was
liquidated. The debtor sent a check for part of the amount and returned the balance of
the goods. The seller cashed the check and informed the buyer after fifty days that it
refused to accept the goods. Held, that cashing the check and keeping the goods, which
were part of the same transaction, was an acceptance and thus the whole debt dis-
charged.)
so 131 Wash 617, 251 Pac. 874 (1927).
s8 160 Wash. 647, 295 Pac. 925 (1931).
82 Seattle Investors Syndicate v. West Dependable Stores of Washington, 177 Wash.
125, 30 P.2d 956 Z1934).
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creditor, even if tendered as payment in full of a larger indebtedness,
can not operate as an accord and satisfaction of the entire indebtedness,
as there is an absence of consideration therefore."3
The orthodox rule was also followed in a case involving the lease of
well drilling equipment,"' and a lease and conditional sales contract."s
There are also dicta in several recent cases to the effect that the pay-
ment of a lesser sum cannot discharge an obligation to pay a sum
certain.8"
This brief survey makes it clear that Douglas County Memorial
Hospital Association v. Newby 7 ignores all the recent cases, which are
not even mentioned, and calls back from hibernation the early cases
which lay dormant for over twenty years. It is the opinion of this
writer that this development is to be applauded as the orthodox rule
is rigid and unrealistic. The abrogation of the orthodox rule means to
the practitioner, that when called upon to work out a settlement he
will not have to use the subterfuge of the proverbial peppercorn. The
criticism of the minority view-that it is unfair to creditors is untenable
since an accord must be based on mutual assent and a creditor cannot
be forced to agree. All the minority rule does is to make such a
voluntary agreement legally binding.
The only criticism of the case is that the decision is based on
estoppel. Thus the orthodox rule is not fully repudiated and uncertainty
is infused into contract law, where certainty and predictability of
results is so important. In Vigelius v. Vigeliusss performance for twelve
years was enough to estop the plaintiff. In Douglas County Memorial
Hospital Association v. Newby"8 this time has been reduced to ten
months. The question of when the executory accord becomes binding
83 Bellingham Securities Syndicate, Inc. v. Bellingham Coal Mines, Inc., 13 Wn.2d
370, 125 P.2d 668 (1942).
84 Mdyer v. Strom, 37 Wn.2d 818, 226 P.2d 218 (1951). The lease provided for a
specific rental per foot of well drilled. Defendant paid the rent into plaintiff's account
stating that a particular job, which defendant did gratuitously, was not included.
Plaintiff remained silent for several months before bringing the action.8
-1 Harris v. Morgensen, 31 Wn.2d 228, 196 P.2d 317 (1948). Lessor became entitled
to 'nmediate possession of demised premises and of personal property covered by a
con-lizional sales contract, because of lessee's default. Held, lessor's promise evidenced
by - written memorandum to pay $500 for lessee's interest in the personal property
unciforceable because of waxit of consideration.
b ;Graham v. New York Life Insurance Co., 182 Wash. 612, 47 P.2d 1029 (1935).
Ac" 'n on life insurance policy, issue whether deceased died as a result of an accident
in which case a double indemnity, or whether he committed suicide. The plaintiff
accepted a check for the amount of the policy with an express agreement in writing
that it was not in full satisfaction. Mosher v. Mosher, 25 Wn.2d 778, 172 P.2d 259
(1946). The court found as a matter of fact that the alleged agreement for the payment
of a lesser sum was never entered into by the parties.
87 Supra note 61.
88 Supra note 75.
89 Supra note 61.
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has not as yet been answered. For instance, would a creditor, who
agreed to extend the time of payment, or to receive the payments in
instalments, or to accept a lesser sum in full satisfaction be estopped
if he changed his mind the following day? The case does not answer
these questions. An outright repudiation of the orthodox rule, which
would make an accord binding from the time of execution, would be




Assumption of Obligations of Purchased Business-Prima Facie
Presumption. If a partnership sells all of its assets to a corporation,
does the corporation thereby become liable for the obligations of the
partnership? This question was one of several arising in Mig & Logging
Supply Co. v. West Tenino Lumber Co.' There the plaintiff brought an
action, in part, for payment of debts incurred by a partnership which
sold all of its assets to the defendant corporation. The court relied on
the rule that a corporation is not liable for the partnership obligations
where no showing is made that it either expressly or impliedly assumed
them. Because of plaintiff's failure to make such an allegation, defend-
ant's demurrer to this particular part of the complaint was sustained.
By way of dictum the court indicated the same rule would apply
had the defendafit corporation been shown to be a mere change in the
partnership business structure. The dictum, it seems, overlooks the fact
that such a showing would in and of itself imply that the corporation
had assumed the partnership debts. This was brought out in Jones v.
Francis,2 Northwest Perfection Tire Co. v. Perfection 'Tire Corp.' and
Seattle I;zvesters' Syndicate v. West Dependable Stores.4 In each
case a new corporation, in substance merely the continuation of an old
corporation, was held liable for the latter's debts. In Bowyer v. Boss
Tweed-Clipper Gold Mines' the court quoted Fletcher, Cyclopedia of
Corporations, with approval, as follows:
The general rule, which is well settled is that where one company sells
or otherwise transfers all its assets to another company, the latter is not
144 Wn2d 102, 265 P2d 807 (1954). See also Contracts at page 93.
2 70 Wash. 676, 127 Pac. 307 (1912).
3 125 Wash. 84, 215 P.2d 360 (1925).
4 177 Wash. 125, 30 P2d 956 (1934).5 195 Wash. 25, 79 P.2d 713 (1938).
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